Regarding the action of God upon the human will there are many quite difficult considerations which it would take too long to investigate here. Nevertheless the following is what can be said in general. God in his ordinary cooperation with our actions merely follows the laws which he has established, that is to say, he continually preserves and produces our being so that the ideas come to us spontaneously or with freedom in that order which the concept of our individual substance requires, in which concept they could be foreseen from all eternity. Furthermore, by virtue of the decree which God has made, that the will shall always seek the apparent good expressing or imitating the will of God in certain particulars so that this apparent good always has something genuine about it, he determines our will to the choice of what seems the best, without however necessitating it. For, absolutely speaking, our will as contrasted with necessity is in a state of indifference, being able to act otherwise, or wholly to suspend its action, either alternative being and remaining_ possible. It is therefore within the power of the soul to be on guard against appearances by means of a firm resolution to reflect and to refuse to act or decide in certain circumstances except after mature deliberation. It is, however, true and has been assured from all eternity that certain souls will not employ that power upon certain occasions.
But who could do more than God has done, and can such a soul complain of anything except itself? All these complaints after the deed are unjust, inasmuch as they would have been unjust before the deed. Would this soul a little before committing the sin have had the right to complain of God as though he had determined it to sin? Since the determinations of God in these matters cannot be foreseen, how would the soul know that it was preordained to sin unless it had already committed the sin? It is merely a question of wishing to or not wishing to, and God could not have set an easier or juster condition. Therefore all judges without asking the reasons which have disposed a man to have an evil will, consider only how far this will is wrong. But, you object, perhaps it is ordained from all eternity that I will sin? Find your own answer. Perhaps it has not been. Now then, without asking for what you are unable to know and in regard to which you can have no light, act according to your duty which you do know. But, some one will object, whence comes it then that this man will assuredly do this sin? The reply is easy. It is that otherwise he would not be this man. For God foresees from all time that there will be a certain Judas, and in the concept or idea of him which God has is contained this free act. The only question, therefore, which remains is, why this Judas, the traitor, who in God’s idea is merely possible, should actually exist. To this question, however, we can expect no answer here on earth excepting to say in general that since God has found it good that he should exist notwithstanding that sin which he foresaw, it must be that this evil will be repaid with interest in the universe and that God will derive a greater good from it, and that it will finally turn out that this series of events in which is included the existence of this sinner, is the most perfect among all the possible series of events. An explanation in every case of the admirable economy of this choice cannot be given while we are sojourners on earth. It is enough to know these things without understanding them. It is here that must be recognized altitudinem divitiarum, the unfathomable depth of the divine wisdom, searching out details which involve an infinite umber of considerations. It is clear, however, that God is not the cause of evil. For not only after the loss of innocence by men, has original sin possessed the soul, but even before that there was an original limitation or imperfection in the very nature of all creatures, which rendered them open to sin and able to fall. There is, therefore, no more difficulty in the supralapsarian view than there is in the other views of sin. To this also, it seems to me can be reduced the opinion of St. Augustine and of other authors: that the root of evil is in negation, that is to say, in the defect or limitation of creatures which God graciously remedies by whatever degree of perfection it pleases him to give. This grace of God, whether ordinary or extraordinary, has its degrees and its measures. It is always efficacious in itself to produce a certain proportionate effect, and furthermore it is always sufficient not only to keep one from sin but even to effect his salvation, provided the man cooperates with that which is in him. It has not always, however, sufficient power to overcome the man’s inclinations, for, if it did, it would be irresistible, and this is reserved to that unique grace which is absolutely efficacious, and which is always victorious whether through its own self or through the cooperation of circumstances.