Finally, the grace of God is absolutely pure grace and creatures have no claim upon it. Just as it is not sufficient in accounting for God’s choice in his dispensations of grace to refer to his absolute or conditional prevision of men’s future actions, so it is also wrong to attribute to him absolute decrees which have no reasonable motive. As concerns foreseen faith and good works, it is very true that God has elected none but those whose faith and charity he foresees, quos se fide donaturum praescivit (“whom he foreknew he would endow with faith”). The same question, however, arises again as to why God gives to some rather than to others the grace of faith or of good works. As concerns God’s ability to foresee not only the faith and good deeds, but also their material and predisposition, or that which a man on his part contributes to them (since there are truly diversities on the part of men where there are diversities of grace, and although a man needs to be aroused to good and needs to become converted, he himself is still the agent of his subsequent acts),—as regards his ability to foresee there are many who say that God, knowing what a particular man would do with- out grace, that is without his extraordinary assistance, or knowing at least what will be man’s part in the affair (leaving grace out of consideration), resolves to give grace to those whose natural dispositions are the best, or at any rate are the least imperfect and evil. But if this were the case then the natural dispositions in so far as they were good would be the effects of ordinary grace, since God would have given advantages to some over others; and therefore, since he would well know that the natural advantages which he had given would serve as motives for his extraordinary grace or assistance, would not everything be reduced to his mercy? I think, therefore, that since we do not know how much and in what way God regards natural dispositions in the dispensations of his grace, it would be safest and most exact to say, in accordance with our principles and as I have already remarked, that there must needs be among possible beings, the person Peter or John whose concept or idea contains all that particular sequence of ordinary and extraordinary manifestations of grace together with the rest of the accompanying events and circumstances, and that it has pleased God to choose him among an infinite number of persons equally possible for actual existence. When we have said this there seems nothing left to ask, and all difficulties vanish. For in regard to that great and ultimate question why it has pleased God to choose him among so great a number of possible persons, it is surely unreasonable to demand more than the general reasons which we have given. The reasons in detail surpass our ken. Therefore, instead of postulating an absolute decree, which being without reason would be unreasonable, and instead of postulating reasons which do not succeed in solving the difficulties and in turn have need themselves of reasons, it will be best to say with St. Paul that there are for God’s choice certain great reasons of wisdom and congruity which he follows, which reasons, however, are unknown to mortals and are founded upon the general order, whose goal is the greatest perfection of the world. This is what is meant when the motives of God’s glory and of the manifestation of his justice are spoken of, as well as when men speak of his mercy, and his perfection in general; that immense vastness of wealth, in fine, with which the soul of the same St. Paul was so thrilled.